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lateral source in the cases dealing with the problem is so small
in relation to the total amount of damages that the courts and
the bar have not bothered to research or to consider the problem
thoroughly. It is submitted that a conscious analysis by the
courts of the dominant motives beneath the rules would lead to
an increase of both the correlation of the rules with announced
principles and the social wisdom of the results.
LEWIS R. MILLS
THE PROCEDURAL EFFECT OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR IN MISSOURI
Though the requirements of a res ipsa case may be readily
stated,1 the application of the doctrine to particular fact situa-
tions has resulted in a mass of perplexing and baffling decisions.
Much of this confusion, which is further complicated by the
impingement at certain critical points of various rules of plead-
ing and evidence, arises from conflicting views concerning the
procedural consequences of the application of the doctrine.2
This note is an effort to analyze the problem in Missouri, and
so will be concerned with a detailed consideration of the Missouri
cases, and in particular with Maybacic v. Falstaff Brewing Co.,8
which has caused much consternation.
The basic factual requirements of a res ipsa case in Missouri
are: (1) an injury caused by an occurrence which would not
ordinarily happen if those in charge are exercising due care,
(2) control and management of the instrumentalities involved
in the defendant and (3) defendant's possession of superior
knowledge or at least superior access to information concerning
the cause of the injury.4
The necessity for the first requirement is obvious; the facts
1. For an excellent general discussion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
see PRoSSER, TORTS 291 (1941).
2. See the discussion comparing the application of this doctrine in the
various states in Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20
MINN. L. REV. 241 (1936).
3. 359 Mo. 446, 222 S.W.2d 87 (1949).
4. E.g., Boulos v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 359 Mo. 763, 223 S.W.2d
446 (1949) ; Welch v. Thompson, 357 Mo. 703, 210 S.W.2d 79 (1948) ; Palmer
v. Brooks, 350 Mo. 1055, 169 S.W.2d 906 (1943) ; McCloskey v. Koplar, 329
Mo. 527, 46 S.W.2d 557 (1932) ; Van Houten v. Kansas City Public Service
Co., 233 Mo. App. 423, 122 S.W.2d 868 (1938). For a general discussion
compare PROSSER, TORTS 291 (1941) with IX WIGMORE, EvMENCE § 2509 (3d
ed. 1940).
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must create a reasonable inference that the accident would not
have occurred absent the negligence of someone,5 or it would be
patently unfair as well as opposed to all existing principles con-
trolling the placing of the burdens of producing evidence and of
persuasion.
The requirement that the defendant be in control of the
accident-causing instrumentalities is designed to ensure that the
negligence may properly be attributed to the defendant and not
to the plaintiff or some stranger. Although the rule as usually
stated is that control relates either to physical control or the
right to controls at the time of the alleged negligent act,7 the
Supreme Court of Missouri, in Mayback v. Falstaff Brewing
Corporation,8 making no reference to that test, stated that in a
res ipsa case the defendant must have at least the right to control
at the time of the injury., Since res ipsa has been considered
5. Grindstaff v. J. Goldberg & Sons Structural Steel Co., 328 Mo. 72, 80,
40 S.W.2d 702, 705 (1931). "To make out a case for the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur the facts relied on must be such as to reasonably
exclude any other hypothesis than that of negligence claimed. .... [It] is
not necessary that they exclude every possible hypothesis except that of the
defendant's negligence." Cruce v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 358 Mo. 589,
216 S.W.2d 78 (1949); Charlton v. Lovelace, 351 Mo. 364, 173 S.W.2d 13
1943) (mere occurrence of an injury is not sufficient to invoke the doctrine) ;
ibbs v. General Motors Corp., 350 Mo. 431, 166 S.W.2d 575 (1942) (facts
must exclude contributory negligence of plaintiff); Estes v. Estes, 127
S.W.2d 78 (Mo. App. 1939) (doctrine not to be applied where it is a surmise
or a mere possibility only that the defendant's negligence caused the dam-
age); Hart v. Emery-Bird-Thayer Dry Goods Co., 233 Mo. App. 312, 118
S.W.2d 509 (1938).
6. Pandjiris v. Oliver Cadillac Co., 339 Mo. 711, 98 S.W.2d 969 (1936);
McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527, 46 S.W.2d 557 (1932) ; Bobbitt v. Sala-
mander, 240 Mo. App. 902, 221 S.W.2d 971 (1949). In quoting an earlier
Missouri case Cruce v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 358 Mo. 589, 593, 216
S.W.2d 78, 80 (1949) states: "'The rule that the exclusive control and
managerhent of the appliance or thing causing the injury must be shown to
have been in the defendant does not mean physical control, but refers to the
right of such control .... '"
7. McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527, 535, 46 S.W.2d 557, 560 (1932).
Some cases quoting the McCloskey case omit the words, "at the time the
negligence was committed," but the clear implication is that such is still
the test. Cruce v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 358 Mo. 589, 216 S.W.2d 78
(1949) (doctrine applies if instrumentality causing the injury was, at the
time, under exclusive control of defendant); Cantley v. Missouri-Kansas-
Texas R.R., 353 Mo. 605, 183 S.W.2d 123 (1944).
8. 359 Mo. 446, 222 S.W.2d 87 (1949).
9. In Mayback v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 359 Mo. 446, 222 S.W.2d 87(1949), Clark, J. citing Charlton v. Lovelace, 351 Mo. 364, 173 S.W.2d 13
(1943), and Gibbs v. General Motors, 350 Mo. 431, 166 S.W.2d 575 (1943),
emphasizes that Missouri does not recognize the control element as being
fulfilled by defendant being in control at the time the negligent act was
committed.
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applicable where there is a possibility of an intermeddler 1° as
well as where an instrumentality other than that of the defen-
dant is involved,11 the Mayback case with its requirement of
control at the time of the injury may mean that a different
criterion is appropriate in bursting bottle cases than is required
in other situations. 12
Because of the underlying theory that one who is in control of
the instrumentality causing the injury will generally have access
to facts unknown to the other party,13 the requirement of de-
fendant's superior knowledge would not need to be independently
established. In fact a showing by plaintiff that he is ignorant
of the facts and that defendant either does 14 or should know them
is not enough to establish a res ipsa case unless the other re-
quirements are also present.
Once it has been determined that the basic requirements for
the application of the doctrine are present, there arises the
question of what procedural effect the doctrine should have. 5
The earlier Missouri cases are characterized by apparent indeci-
sion as to which party has the burden of proof (risk of non-
10. Bobbitt v. Salamander, 240 Mo. App. 902, 221 S.W.2d 971 (1949),
Hart v. Emery-Bird-Thayer Dry Goods Co., 233 Mo. App. 312, 118 S.W.2d
509 (1938). The basis for this has been that res ipsa is a matter of prob-
ability anyway.
11. Belding v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 205 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App.
1947), reversed 358 Mo. 491, 215 S.W.2d 506 (1948); Stephens v. Kansas
City Gas Co., 354 Mo. 835, 191 S.W.2d 601 (1946); Zichler v. St. Louis
Public Service Co., 332 Mo. 902, 59 S.W.2d 654 (1933).
12. Compare Mayback v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 359 Mo. 446, 222 S.W.2d
87 (1949) (bursting bottle case), with McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527,
46 S.W.2d 557 (1932) (falling object case).
13. McClintock v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 257 S.W.2d 180
(Mo. App. 1953). Defendant' kept a skilled crew on its elevators and
checked them every two hours. A newly hired seventeen-year-old mail clerk
was injured on the elevator. The court declared that under the facts the
defendant must have superior knowledge of the cause of the accident.
14. Venditti v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 380F Mo. 42, 46, 226 S.W.2d
599, 602 (1950). In McClintock v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 257 S.W.2d
180 (Mo. App. 1953) defendant argued that the discovery procedure under
the Missouri Code of Civil Procedure had ended the necessity for the res
ipsa doctrine because plaintiff's knowledge could, at least, equal defendant's.
The court merely declined any serious consideration and summarily dismissed
the argument.
15. In a res ipsa case some kind of negligence is inferred from the fact
of the unusual occurrence itself. In a specific negligence case, some evi-
dentiary facts sufficient to show that some negligent acts were the proximate
cause of the accident must be presented. E.g., Mueller v. St. Louis Public
Service Co., 358 Mo. 247, 214 S.W.2d 1 (1948); Palmer v. Brooks, 350 Mo.
1055, 169 S.W.2d 906 (1943); Harke v. Haase, 335 Mo. 1104, 75 S.W.2d
1001 (1934).
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persuasion) in a res ipsa case.'16 But beginning with McCloskey
v. Koplar 7 and strengthened by subsequent decisions, 8 the rule
as developed is that the doctrine results merely in a permissive
inference of negligence. Although the plaintiff was given the
benefit of a presumption 9 in certain carrier cases decided after
the McCloskey case, those decisions have been overruledY' It is
likely that the fluctuating opinion in the earlier cases is at-
tributable to a failure to recognize that res ipsa loquitur is
merely a rule of evidence which changes the method by which
plaintiff is permitted to established defendant's negligence,21
16. Schaefer v. St. Louis Suburban Ry., 128 Mo. 64, 30 S.W. 331 (1895).
Plaintiff was injured when attempting to board defendant's train. In-
struction placing the burden of proof upon the defendant was held to have
been properly refused. But cf. Price v. Metropolitan Street Ry., 220
Mo. 435, 119 S.W. 932 (1909) (burden of proof in a carrier collision
case was placed upon the defendant carrier); accord, e.g., Fowlkes v.
Fleming, 332 Mo. 718, 17 S.W.2d 511 (1929); Bond v. St. Louis-San Fran-
cisco Ry., 315 Mo. 987, 288 S.W. 777 (1926). These decisions and others led
competent writers to conclude that in some cases, at least, the Missouri
courts shifted the risk of non persuasion onto the defendant in a res ipsa
case. Prosser, supra note 2 at 246; Heckel and Harper, Effect of the Doc-
trine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 22 ILL. L. REv. 724, 734 (1928).
17. 329 Mo. 527, 46 S.W.2d 557 (1932).
18. Rothweiler v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 224 S.W.2d 569, 575
(Mo. App. 1949).
"It has been pointed out that the rule of res ipsa loquitur merely means
that the facts of an occurrence may warrant an inference of negligence,
but will not compel it; that while such circumstantial evidence of negligence
is to be weighed, it is not necessarily to be accepted as sufficient; and that
such evidence merely makes a case to be decided by the jury, and does not in
any sense forestall the verdict." Accord, e.g., Charlton v. Lovelace, 351 Mo.
364, 173 S.W.2d 13 (1943); Turner v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 346
Mo. 28, 142 S.W.2d 455 (1940); Pandjiris v. Oliver Cadillac Co., 339 Mo.
711, 98 S.W.2d 969 (1936); Williams v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry.,
337 Mo. 667, 85 S.W.2d 624 (1935); Tabler v. Perry, 337 Mo. 154, 85
S.W.2d 471 (1935); Harke v. Haase, 335 Mo. 1104, 75 S.W.2d 1001 (1934);
Glasco Electric Co. v. Union Electric Light and Power Co., 332 Mo. 1079,
61 S.W.2d 955 (1933); Walsh v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 331 Mo.
118, 52 S.W.2d 839 (1932); Hervies v. Bond Stores, 231 Mo. App. 1053, 84
S.W.2d 153 (1935).
19. Hartnett v. May Department Stores Co., 231 Mo. App. 1116, 85
S.W.2d 644 (1935) (escalator case).
20. Duncan v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 355 Mo. 733, 197 S.W.2d
964 (1946); Duncker v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 241 S.W.2d 64, 67
(Mo. App. 1951).
21. The cases involving negligence in a bailment situation are particularly
interesting. The plaintiff makes his case for res ipsa upon showing the
facts of the bailment and the failure of return or a return in a damaged
condition. At that point the courts say that the defendant has the burden
of going forward with the evidence (in an effort to rebut this inference of
negligence that will go to the jury), but not the burden of proof. E.g.,
Bommer v. Stedelin, 237 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. App. 1951); Oliver Cadillac Co.
v. Rosenberg, 179 S.W.2d 476 (Mo. App. 1944). But ef. Bock v. Eilen, 211
S.W.2d 92, 97 (Mo. App. 1948) in which case defendant had hired a boat
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and is not a rule of substantive law.22 In spite of the fact that
the cases continue to speak of shifting the burden of going for-
ward with the evidence to the defendant,2 3 the clear indication
is that neither party is entitled to a directed verdict once a res
ipsa case has been established. It is highly doubtful that the
court would direct a verdict for a res ipsa plaintiff even if the
defendant fails to introduce evidence,24 which would be a neces-
sary result if the burden of producing evidence was truly
shifted.2 5 Perhaps the semantic difficulty involved would be
obviated by increased emphasis on the permissive nature of the
inference.
Given the essentials of a res ipsa situation, plaintiff must still
surmount certain pleading problems before he is entitled to the
application of the doctrine. Because an underlying policy for
allowing res ipsa is defendant's superior knowledge, the Missouri
courts have denied the use of the doctrine in a case where it
would otherwise apply, when specific acts of negligence are also
alleged.2 6 Earlier cases, however, that overlooked, disregarded,
or criticized this rule2 7 have not been effectively harmonized With
the present view.
28
from plaintiff. The court said, "This is not a case where an article is taken
into possession by a bailee and lost, or a case where the burden would have
been on the bailee to show freedom from negligence, or to show that his
failure to return the boat was not due to negligence on his part. Such may
be the general rule in bailments; but, in this case, plaintiff had alleged
carelessness and negligence on the part of the bailee."
22. Dodson v. Maddox, 359 Mo. 742, 223 S.W.2d 434 (1949); Belding v.
St. Louis Public Service Co., 358 Mo. 491, 215 S.W.2d 506 (1948).
23. Turner v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 346 Mo. 28, 142 S.W.2d
455 (1940); Carroll v. May Department Stores, 237 Mo. App. 983, 180
S.W.2d 793 (1944); Glossip v. Kelly, 228 Mo. App. 392, 67 S.W.2d 513
(1934).
24. Rothweiler v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 224 S.W.2d 569 (Mo. App.
1949); Charlton v. Lovelace, 351 Mo. 364, 173 S.W.2d 13 (1943); Turner
v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., supra, note 23; Pandjiris v. Oliver Cadillac
Co., 339 Mo. 711, 98 S.W.2d 969 (1936); Glasco Electric Co. v. Union Elec-
tric Light and Power Co., 332 Mo. 1079, 61 S.W.2d 955 (1933).
25. IX WIGM1ORE, EVIDENCE § 2491 (3d ed. 1940).
26. Maxie v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 356 Mo. 633, 202 S.W.2d 904
(1947); Crupe v. Spicuzza, 86 S.W.2d 347 (Mo. App. 1935). But cf. Dodson
v. Maddox, 359 Mo. 722, 223 S.W.2d 434 (1949). For a collection of Missouri
cases, and the views of other jurisdictions, see note, 40 U. of Mo. BULL. L.
RBv. 41 (1928). Plaintiff must recover, if at all, by proving the specific acts
alleged.
27. Gannon v. Laclede Gas Light Co., 145 Mo. 502, 47 S.W. 907 (1898);
Gallagher v. Edison Illuminating Co., 72 Mo. App. 576 (1897) (the court
held that plaintiff was not restricted to recovery upon specific negligence
alleged where plaintiff first alleged negligence generally and then alleged
certain particular defects that existed).
28. Sanders v. Carthage, 330 Mo. 844, 51 S.W.2d 529 (1931).
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Having ruled that res ipsa is available only under a charge of
"general negligence, 2 , the Missouri courts have found it difficult
to distinguish between specific and general allegations with any
real consistency, although the distinction may be verbalized
quite simply:
:.. To constitute a specific allegation of negligence as contra
distinguished from a general allegation, an enumeration and
averment of the specific act or acts relied upon as a ground
of recovery must be made.30
The usual difficulties that arise from applying a general rule to
particular facts are present in this area.3 1 An examination of
the manner in which two petitions were construed will best
illustrate the problem.
In Price v. Metropolitan Street Ry.32 a petition which alleged
that defendant carelessly and negligently caused and permitted
its train to collide with another of defendant's trains was held
to charge general negligence only, on the ground that plaintiff
made no attempt to specify any particular act of negligence by
defendant's engineer. Seven years later, the same court held
that a petition which charged defendant with owning a faulty
and defective "racer dip" and maintaining and operating it in
a careless and negligent manner charged specific negligence.
33
Since the first of these cases concerns a common carrier, perhaps
the indication is that there is a tendency to construe the allega-
tions in carrier cases as alleging general negligence only.34
Furthermore, an interesting statement was made by the court
in Williams v. St. Louis Public Service CoA5 where a complaint
similar to that in the Price case was also held to contain only
general allegations of negligence. The court said:
29. These are the words used by the courts, but, in reality, both an allega-
tion of the existence of the res ipsa requirements and a charge of general
negligence are required. See e.g., Maxie v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 356
Mo. 633, 202 S.W.2d 904 (1947).
30. Porter v. St. Joseph Ry., Light, Heat & Power Co., 311 Mo. 66, 74,
277 S.W. 913, 915 (1925).
31. May Department Stores Co. v. Bell, 61 F.2d 830, 836 (8th Cir. 1932).
The court collects the Missouri cases construing allegations as specific or
negligent at 836, 837.
32. 220 Mo. 435, 119 S.W. 913 (1909).
33. Pointer v. Mountain Ry. Construction Co., 269 Mo. 104, 189 S.W. 805
(1916).
34. E.g., Williams v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 253 S.W.2d 97 (Mo.
1952); Boulos v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 359 Mo. 763, 223 S.W.2d
446 (1949).
35. 253 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1952).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1953/iss4/9
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The pleadings and evidence may be such that a cause may
be submitted on either general or specific negligence at
plaintiff's election.36
The court apparently was referring to a situation in which
the specific cause of the accident might be inferred from the
available facts.- The plaintiff's "election" was to base his case
on res ipsa or attempt to recover by proving the specific cause
of the accident by circumstantial evidence. In any event, plaintiff
was not to be deprived of the res ipsa benefit merely because the
specific cause might be inferred from the facts. This ruling
and cases such as Maxie v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio I.R.,37 wherein
the court advised the plaintiff to amend his petition by deleting
the specific allegations of negligence in order to take advantage
of res ipsa at the new trial, shows a trend toward construction
of the complaint to favor plaintiff.
At this point notice should be taken of a general rule of plead-
ing which may aid the plaintiff who has plead generally ,but has
failed to establish the requisites for res ipsa. The rule is suc-
cinctly stated in a fairly recent case as follows:
... [I]n most cases where the res ipsa loquitur rule is not
applicable and general negligence only is pleaded such is
sufficient, absent a motion to make more definite and cer-
in... .-Is [defendant raised the issue of pleading generally
for the first time on the appeal].
Of course a petition which wholly fails to state a cause of action
may be attacked at any time,39 but in order to state a cause of
action plaintiff is only required to describe the act complained
of with such reasonable certainty necessary to inform defen-
dant of the charge.40 Actually, however, the problem here is
whether or not defendant has placed the plaintiff's petition in
36. Id. at 102.
37. 356 Mo. 633, 202 S.W.2d 904 (1947). See also, 13 Mo. L. REV. 110, 113(1948).
38. Barrickman v. National Utilities Co., 191 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Mo. App.
1945) ; Accord, e.g., Welch v. Thompson, 357 Mo. 703, 210 S.W.2d 79 (1948) ;
Stephens v. Kansas City Gas Co., 354 Mo. 835, 191 S.W.2d 601 (1946);
Palmer v. Brooks, 350 Mo. 1055, 169 S.W.2d 906 (1943); Zichler v. St.
Louis Public Service Co., 332 Mo. 902, 59 S.W.2d 654 (1933). These cases
would be supported by the present Missouri statutes concerning this ques-
tion. MO. REV. STAT. §§ 509.310, 509.330 (1949).
39. Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 509.340 (1949).
40. Cushulas v. Schroeder & Tremayne, 225 Mo. 567, 22 S.W.2d 872(1930). The problem as to just what particularity is required to state a
cause of action must be recognized, but is without the scope of this article.
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issue in a timely manner rather than whether a cause of action
has been stated.
A similar situation formerly obtained if plaintiff did move
to make the complaint more definite and certain, and after his
motion was overruled went to trial on the merits. In that case
the defendant was held to have waived his right to have the
complaint made more specific by going to trial on the merits.41
A recent Missouri statute,42 however, has abolished the waiver
theory by providing that pleading over or going to trial on the
merits constitutes no waiver of any objection raised by motion
at the proper time.4 3 It is clear, however, that failure to move to
make more definite and certain a complaint containing only gen-
eral allegations of negligence may have precisely the same effect
as though the case were truly a res ipsa or other case entitling
plaintiff to go to the jury without pleading and proving specific
negligence. It must be emphasized that this is not an enlarge-
ment of the res ipsa area, but is rather in the nature of a penalty
on defendants whose attorneys plead improperly, imposed not out
of a desire for revenge but in order to further the timely and
orderly administration of justice.
Even though a plaintiff has established by proper pleadings a
res ipsa case, he may yet lose the procedural advantages attaching
to the application of that doctrine by introducing unsuitable evi-
dence. Thus if the plaintiff's own evidence shows clearly the cause
of the accident and leaves nothing in doubt, the res ipsa inference
is lost to plaintiff,"4 although evidence which merely tends to
show the specific cause will not defeat the application of the
doctrine.45 Again the rule is one which is very difficult of applica-
41. E.g., Hanson v. City Light and Traction Co., 238 Mo. App. 182, 178
S.W.2d 804 (1944) ; Kitchen v. Schlueter Mfg. Co., 323 Mo. 1179, 20 S.W.2d
676 (1929); State ex rel. Brancato v. Trimble, 322 Mo. 318, 18 S.W.2d 4
(1929) ; Sperry v. Hurd, 267 Mo. 628, 185 S.W. 170 (1916).
42. Mo. REv. STAT. §509.340 (1949). "[N]or shall pleading over or enter-
ing into the trial of the merits be deemed to waive any objection properly
raised by motion. ."
43. Under Mo. REv. STAT. § 512.020 (1949) denial of a motion to make
more definite and certain is not appealable at the instance of denial, but
the indication is, however, that an appeal could be taken on such motion
after the trial. Hartvedt v. Harpst, 173 S.W.2d 6&, 67 (Mo. 1949). "A
motion to make more definite and certain is addressed to the sound discre-
tion of the court . . . and its discretion, when soundly exercised, will not
be disturbed by this court." (Italics added.)
44. Williams v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 253 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1952).
45. Ibid. The analysis of the court seems inadequate in this area. See
PzossER, ToRTs 306 (1941).
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tion and seems to lead to contradictory results. Representative
illustration seems appropriate here to show the impossibility of
synthesis at a more particularized level. The first four of the
following cases represent situations in which the evidence was.
held not to show such an exact cause as to preclude application, of
the res ipsa doctrine:
(1) Plaintiff's witness testified that defendant's streetcar
suddenly checked its speed thereby causing an extraordinary and
unusual lurch.4 6 (2) Evidence was introduced by plaintiff that
defendant's operators were negligent in starting the car while
the plaintiff had one foot upon the step as he was attempting to
take passage on defendant's streetcar. 4T (3) Plaintiff tendered
proof that defendant was negligent in failure to have cross bells.
in operation, failure to keep a proper lookout, untimely applica-
tion of the brakes, and traveling at excessive speed; the court
said that this evidence failed to show a single cause.48 (4) Plain-
tiff, who was a fare collector on defendant's train,49 introduced
evidence tending to show that the rails were in a defective con-
dition.50
Plaintiff is of course bound by his own evidence; but proof of specific
facts does not necessarily exclude inferences. When the plaintiff shows
that the railway car in which he was a passenger was derailed, there
is an inference that the defendant has been negligent. When he goes
further and shows that the derailment was caused by an open switch,
he destroys any inference of other causes, but the inference that the
defendant has not used proper care in looking after its switches is not
destroyed, but strengthened. If he goes further still and shows that the
switch was left open by a drunken switchman on duty, there is nothing
left to infer; and if he shows that the switch was thrown by an escaped
convict with a grudge against the railroad, he has proved himself out
of court. It is only in this sense that when the facts are known there
is no inference, and res ispa loquitur vanishes from the case. It is quite
generally agreed that the introduction of evidence which does not pur-
port to furnish a complete explanation of the occurrence does not de-
prive the plaintiff of res ipsa loquitur.
46. Ibid.
47. Boulos v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 359 Mo. 763, 223 S.W.2d
446 (1949).
48. Timmons v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 231 Mo. App. 421, 100
S.W.2d 624 (1936).
49. Williams v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R. 337 Mo. 667, 686, 85
S.W.2d 624, 635 (1935). If res ipsa would ordinarily apply, the fact that
the action is brought under the Federal Employer's Liability Act will not
preclude the application of the doctrine. Gordon v. Muehling Packing Co
328 Mo. 123, 40 S.W.2d 693 (1931), is cited as resolving the question o?
the application of res ipsa in a master-servant case in favor of the plaintiff-
servant.
50. Williams v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R., 337 Mo. 667, 85 S.W.2d
624 (1935).
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In the following cases the res ipsa inference was lost to plain-
tiff because the court felt that his evidence proved the exact
cause of the accident: (1) Plaintiff's evidence brought out that
defendant's driver was tardy in applying the brakes because he
was distracted in a conversation with some third person.51 (2)
Evidence introduced by plaintiff showed that defendant's motor-
bus skidded before hitting the curb.52 (3) Plaintiff proved the
good condition of the wiring in her house, the falling of a tree
upon defendant's outside wires, and the improper grounding of
defendant's wires.13 (4) Plaintiff offered evidence showing that
the board which fell from defendant's building and struck plain-
tiff was old and was held in position with old rusty nails.54
Though the rules in this area defy definite formulation, one
observation seems appropriate. Plaintiff may introduce evidence
tending to show many negligent acts so long as the sole cause
is left unexplained. The benefit of the doctrine is lost only when
a particular court in interpreting the pleadings in light of the
facts feels that plaintiff's evidence has shown the only possible
explanation for the accident.
Successful disposition of the above problems will entitle plain-
tiff to a res ipsa instruction. An approved plaintiff's instruction
is set forth in Harke v. Haase:
Then you are instructed that such facts (if you believe
them to be true) are sufficient circumstantial evidence to
warrant a finding by you that defendant was negligent, and
you may so find, unless you find and believe from other facts
and circumstances in evidence that the occurrence was not
due to the defendant's negligence .... 55
In addition to plaintiff's instruction, however, two other types
of instructions need consideration. The first of these is called
defendant's "burden of proof" instruction. One form of this in-
struction which has been approved at least under the circum-
stances of the particular case is as follows:
The Court instructs the jury that negligence is not in law
presumed, but must be established by proof as explained in
other instructions.
51. Lochmoeller v. Kiel, 137 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. App. 1940).
52. Heidt v. People's Motorbus Co. of St. Louis, 219 Mo. App. 683, 284
S.W. 840 (1926).
53. Conduitt v. Trenton Gas and Electric Co., 326 Mo. 133, 31 S.W.2d
21 (1930).
54. McAnny v. Shipley, 189 Mo. App. 396, 176 S.W.2d 1079 (1915).
55. 335 Mo. 1104, 1111, 75 S.W.2d 1001, 1004 (1934).
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* . .[Y] ou are not able to make a finding that defendant
was liable without resorting to surmise, guesswork and
speculation outside of and beyond the scope of the evidence,
and the reasonable inference deductible therefrom, then it is
your duty to, and you must, return a verdict for defendant."
The other is plaintiff's "counter burden of proof instruction," of
which the following is an example:
To meet and carry her burden of proof in this case,... [the
plaintiff] was not required to prove some certain and specific
act of negligence or more specific omission of care by the
defendant."
Both instructions are regarded as cautionary and so within the
discretion of the trial judge.5 8 Although not favored by the
appellate courts,55 the giving of these instructions will be ap-
proved so long as the clarity (required from a reading) of the
instructions as a whole is not thereby destroyed °0 Consideration
of the instruction problem continues in an effort to instruct the,
jury in as clear a fashion as possible61
THE MAYBACK CASE
In 1949 the Missouri Supreme Court denied the applicability
of res ipsa because defendant did not have exclusive control at
the time of the injury, but permitted a petition alleging only
general negligence to stand because, the court said, plaintiff had
stated her cause with as much particularity as could be required
under the circumstances. 2
The petition states a claim upon which relief may be
granted. It is undoubtedly good as against the attack which
56. West v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 361 Mo. 740, 747, 236 S.W.2d
308, 312 (1951).
57. Schwinegruber v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 241 S.W.2d 782, 785
(Mo. App. 1951).
58. West v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 361 Mo. 740, 236 S.W.2d 308(1951), and cases cited therein. There will be no interference with this dis-
cretion unless there is a patently clear abuse.
59. Ibid.
60. West v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 361 Mo. 740, 236 S.W.2d 308
(1951), and cases cited therein.
61. See Comment, 3 J. Mo. BAR 21 (1947), for a more detailed discussion
of the Har'ke case and suggestions for further improvement of res ipsa in-
structions.
62. Mayback v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 359 Mo. 446, 222 S.W.2d 87(1949). Plaintiff was suing the manufacturer of beer bottles which had
exploded and which had been out of defendant's control for seven or eight
days. Plaintiff offered evidence to disprove negligence of any intervening
parties and of explosion of other bottles from the same shipment handled
in the same manner.
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appellant made after verdict, and we think it is sufficient
even had the attack been more timely. 3 [Italics added.]
The italicized statement above is readily recognized as dicta, but
the analysis which follows seems justified in light of the emphasis
attached by the court. It will be remembered that under the
earlier cases, whether a motion to make more definite and certain
should be sustained or overruled depended solely upon whether
the case was one to which the res ipsa was applicable. 4 Under
the Mayback pronouncement, on the other hand, the propriety of
sustaining or overruling such a motion does not depend solely
on whether the facts present a case for the application of res
ipsa; seemingly there is a third and new category. The Mayback
case would seem to say, then, that the motion to make more defi-
nite and certain should be sustained only if the plaintiff fails to
bring himself within the scope of the res ipsa doctrine or if he
fails to otherwise bring himself within some as yet undefined
classification which would likewise permit him to state a cause of
action without alleging specific acts of negligence.
Although this new ruling has been applied only in bursting
bottle cases,1' and the older policy is still otherwise prevailing,
Mayback indicates that such a petition would be acceptable in
any situation where the nature of the case demands.6 8 Extension
to other situations would relieve the plaintiff of the burden of
proving specific acts of negligence though denying him res ipsa;
however, some evidence negating negligence of an intervener
would be required of the plaintiff. The type and quantum of
evidence required apparently must be determined by the facts
of the particular case.
Though it is difficult to determine the effect of the Mayback
case 6 at this juncture, a new fringe or middle ground may have
63. Mayback v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 359 Mo. 446, 455, 222 SW.2d 87,
92 (1949).
64. Zichler v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 332 Mo. 902, 59 S.W.2d 654(1933).
65. Stephens v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 232 S.W.2d 181
(Mo. App. 1950).
66. See note 63, supra.
Where from the nature of the case, the plaintiff in an action for
negligence could not be expected to know the exact cause of the precise
negligent act which became the cause of the injury, and the facts were
peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, the plaintiff is not
required to allege the particular cause.
67. See note 63, supra. A superficial glance might convince one that an
attempt to check the spread of res ipsa is in evidence; the better view,
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been opened. At either extreme is the true res ipsa and the true
specific negligence case, but as the facts shift away from both ex-
tremes we reach a shaded area where one of the elements (usually
the exclusive control requirement) is lacking, but where the facts
do not justify forcing plaintiff to plead and prove specific negli-
gence. Under such a rule the plaintiff, after submitting facts
sufficient to relieve him of the burden of pleading and proving
specific negligence, would apparently gain every procedural ad-
vantage to which he would have been entitled had the doctrine
been applicable. Perhaps nothing more has been done than to
recognize that res ipsa is merely a kind of circumstantial evi-
dence in which the force of the inference should depend upon the
strength of plaintiff's case.
CONCLUSION
Certain general statements may be ventured concerning the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in Missouri.
1. Procedural Effect:
The courts treat the doctrine as nothing more than a per-
missive inference in those cases in which it applies. Actually,
since plaintiff could not obtain a directed verdict, the burden
of going forward with the evidence never really shifts.
2. Allegation of Negligence:
If the plaintiff is to be afforded the advantage of res ipsa,
he must first allege general negligence. An allegation of
specific negligence will preclude plaintiff from any possibility
of the doctrine being applied, even if the plaintiff also pleads
general negligence. There is a conflict in Missouri concern-
ing which are specific and which are general allegations of
negligence, and this conflict cannot be resolved by any gen-
eralizations.
3. Introduction of Specific Evidence:
A plaintiff who has brought himself within the res ipsa situ-
ation may introduce evidence of defendant's negligence so
long as that evidence does not show the exact cause of the
accident. Again, it is difficult to foretell just what evidence
will so clearly prove the precise cause.
however, appears to this writer to be to recognize an extension of res ipsa
under a different name in order to encompass fact situations similar to the
principal case and allow plaintiff certain procedural benefits. For an ex-
cellent discussion with a similar approach, see Note, The Applicability of
the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur to Cases Involving Bursting Bottles,
1951 WASH. U.L.Q. 216, 233 (1951).
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4. Effect of Verdict:
(a) If the plaintiff alleges negligence generally and the de-
fendant does not move to make more definite and certain
until after the verdict, any defects in plaintiff's petition are
considered waived. This waiver occurs even though plaintiff
does not have a res ipsa case.
(b) If the defendant does move for a more definite and cer-
tain statement and is overruled, he may proceed to the trial
on the merits without waiving any defects raised by the
motion. The motion, however, is not appealable at the time
of the ruling, but may be assigned as error on the appeal
from the judgment.
5. General Negligence:
There are a few cases that have held that general allegations
of negligence are sufficient as against a motion to make more
definite and certain even though res ipsa does not apply.
These cases have thus far been limited to bursting bottles,
but from the language used there is no reason why it may not
later be extended to other cases in which the only res ipsa
requirement lacking is the exclusive control in the defendant
at the time of the injury.
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